The paper describes how poverty and exclusion within Santiago has been overlooked, in part, because of the city's strong economic performance and impressive aggregate social indicators. It highlights how segregrated the city has become -for instance the political fragmentation and the large differentials between the 34 municipalities that make up Greater Santiago in terms of their per capita income, quality of education, extent of new building investment, and municipal authorities' levels of income and expenditure. It also describes the loss of social and physical space for public interaction and the rising perception of insecurity. It suggests that such problems are in part linked to the lack of democratic structures within Santiago since it lacks a democratic metropolitan government and most power, resources and decisions remain with national ministries.
I. INTRODUCTION
CHILE HAS BEEN presented as the success story of Latin America, based on its macroeconomic performance -with its stable economic growth over the past decade (averaging 7.6 per cent a year (2) -and its social indicators. Santiago, its capital, has a diversified economy in which financial services are predominant. It concentrates 48 per cent of Chile's Gross Domestic Product and its economy grew even more rapidly than the national economy -with an average growth rate over the past decade of 8.5 per cent. (3) In the last few years, unemployment rates have decreased in Santiago and it has the lowest levels of poverty in the country. This is both in terms of the proportion of people classified as "indigent" (where income levels are insufficient to satisfy the minimum conditions for nutrition) and classified as poor (with an income-based poverty line that makes some allowance for non-food items). The proportion of Santiago's population that was "indigent" fell from 9.6 per cent in 1990 to 3.5 per cent in 1998; the proportion below the poverty line fell from 33 per cent to 15.4 per cent. Although the Asian crisis has affected these figures, both Chile and Santiago are likely to return to their successful paths.
A closer look at Santiago reveals a more complex and less successful side. The city combines areas of unequivocal economic success, others of partial or limited success and others which have remained marginalized. Santiago is very segregated in socio-economic terms. Different income groups concentrate in specific and differentiated areas of the city. The higher-income groups are found in only six of the 34 comunas that make up Greater Santiago and lower-income groups are found in 20. Although there is almost 100 per cent coverage in basic infrastructure and public services, the quality of provision is unequal and differs greatly between distinct suburbs or sectors of the city.
Santiago is also a city whose inhabitants live with fear and unease. Although it is one of the safest cities in Latin America, a feeling of insecurity, related to delinquent violence, prevails, permeating even the political and economic institutional system.
Finally, in political and administrative terms, Santiago is not a city. Greater Santiago consists of 34 comunas, 32 in the Province of Santiago and one each in the provinces of Cordillera and Maipo. Although each comuna has an autonomous municipality, there is still direct intervention from central government institutions, and the fields and responsibilities of the different authorities are not clearly stated. This segregated, fearful and fragmented Santiago embodies a new and radical paradox: a city threatened by the loss of its physical and social public space. In part, it is because of the country's recent history (a de facto government from 1973 until 1989) that Chilean society started to look inwards and take refuge in family and close friends.
The situation is even more serious in the poorer sectors. Their fragmentation and loss were much exacerbated by the massive forced eradication in the 1980s (during the military dictatorship) of almost 180,000 inhabitants from precarious settlements (campamentos) in the Greater Santiago area. They were literally taken out of the comunas where they lived and relocated to the outskirts of the city, particularly to the south, in places that were determined by the authorities. (4) This eradication caused problems of uprooting and loss not only of known physical spaces but also of social space. It has also meant the loss of a sense of refuge in those familiar spaces that have been experienced as both a source of protection and a focus of allegiance, namely, the home, the sports centre and the neighbourhood committee.
II. METROPOLIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION
CHILE'S POPULATION IS concentrated in urban areas (85 per cent), and more than one-third of its urban population is found in the Santiago area. This urban concentration is not recent but rather the result of an incremental process over this century. By the beginning of the 1930s, Chile's urban population already exceeded its rural population. Different authors have associated the urbanization process with import-substitution industrialization that occurred from the end of the 1930s to the mid-1970s, which concentrated industrial, commercial and financial activities in Santiago.
Towards the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, various changes were made in the economic model, with the opening up of Chile's economy to the world and with a boom in exports of agricultural, forestry and fishing products. This led to an assumption that there would be new spatial trends in the country. But this did not happen. Rather, the economic activities and capital remained concentrated in Santiago, as did the population, (5) 5. What has really changed is the speed of the urbanization process. Between 1952 and 1960, while the urban population grew at a rate of 39.8 per 1,000, the population of the country as a whole grew at a rate of 25.3 per 1,000; the difference corresponds to the net rural to urban migration. The findings of the 1992 census show that the importance of migration has decreased to a rate of 1.5 per 1,000. phases: (6) in the first, there was a dispersion of economic activities and a strong decline in the economic activities of Santiago; and in the second, during the mid-1980s, once the higher intensity restructuring period had passed, there was a return to the economic and demographic concentration trends in the metropolitan region (see Table 1 ).
Although the metropolitan region -which includes the Greater Santiago area -has regained its historical share in GDP, the employment structure has changed. In the period 1969-94, participation in industrial employment decreased (30.8 to 21.8 per cent) whilst that in the service sector increased (30.7 to 37.5 per cent) (see Table 2 ). These changes are explained by the opening up of the Chilean economy to the world markets, resulting in Santiago playing a secondary node role in the larger global cities network. In the mid-1980s, with the opening up of financial markets, Santiago, which traditionally had concentrated national financial services, started to host the headquarters of foreign banks, and specialized services for producers (for instance informatics, consultants); more recently, it has become a place for external investment. (7) These activ- 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 ities, linked to the global economy, also have their own architectural expression and urban location, and have changed the city's profile. In this way, even though the list of Chilean cities has not been substantially modified, the economic transformation and concentration processes have initiated important changes in their spatial configuration. This is especially so in the case of Santiago.
III. THE FACADE OF SEGREGATION
SANTIAGO IS A very segregated city in socioeconomic terms. Although conditions for the poor have improved markedly since 1990, the spatial distribution of poverty in the city has not changed much. In urban areas where poverty persists, there are low levels of education, under-employment, low self-esteem, weak networks for access to opportunities, and a population that is socially stigmatized by crime, violence and drug addiction.
The Santiago urban area is clearly differentiated according to family income. Higher-income groups are concentrated in six of the city's 34 comunas and this results in major differences in both the quality and quantity of infrastructure and services, as well as housing. An inter-comuna analysis of poverty shows that: q in nine comunas, 0-10 per cent of the population is poor; q in 11 comunas, 10-20 per cent of the population is poor; q in five comunas, 20-30 per cent of the population is poor.
There are large variations between comunas in the proportion of the population who have below poverty line incomes -for instance from only 1.6 per cent in Ñuñoa, a comuna that is mostly inhabited by middle-income groups, to 29.2 per cent in La Pintana. In general terms, the old poor zones, mostly located on the outskirts of the city, have remained poor.
a. The Persistence of "Hard" Urban Poverty
It has been impossible for a sector of Santiago's population to overcome their poverty. They show high levels of marginality and a trend towards an inter-generational perpetuation of poverty. They also generally show very low educational levels, little training and limited access to opportunity networks.
Such chronic poverty accounts for most of the current poverty in Santiago but it is not representative of all poverty situations. A more recent phenomenon involves people being out of the labour market for long periods due to economic restructuring and technological innovation. In part, this may be due to the fact that, given their lack of opportunities, they have been unable to "recycle" themselves within the labour market. But it is also due to the types of employment that the economy is offering, especially for women, the elderly, youth and workers with low education levels. It is important to note that, even though a large number of the unemployed and informal workers in Santiago are poor, the majority of the poor work in the formal sector. This is related to the fact that the majority of people living in poverty -particularly in urban areas -are workers with few qualifications and low incomes. This is one of the most characteristic traits of both the national economy and the urban economy. Nearly three-quarters of those who fall below the poverty line (who receive less than two minimum salaries as a wage) work in businesses with fewer than 10 workers, or are independent workers.
The unemployment rate in extreme poverty groups is almost four times that of the national average and is 15 times higher than the rate in the richest sectors. This situation is especially acute among the youth in poor comunas, who exhibit unemployment levels many times greater than the national average, and among women, especially women heads of household whose income is the main family support and who make up 22 per cent of the households in the country. In the metropolitan region, the percentage of households headed by women is higher (24 per cent).
Although poverty and indigence levels have decreased over the past decade (see Table 3 ), inequity has persisted, with an increasing gap between social groups, generating a perception of relative impoverishment and reducing the capacity to overcome poverty. According to several opinion surveys, the poor sectors do not perceive themselves as favoured despite new institutional dispositions (e.g. increases in the minimum wage, tax reform, increases in social expenditure) which have contributed towards overcoming poverty by increasing incomes. Per capita incomes for the richest tenth of the population are still 40 times those of the poorest tenth.
b. Inequity in Access to Basic Services
Overall, Santiago has good coverage in basic infrastructure and services. The weaknesses appear in the quality of the services offered to lowincome groups. The fact that Santiago has good public service coverage implies a change in concern from one of quantity to one of quality. This is best illustrated by the education service, given the premise that education is one of the ways of overcoming poverty. All the municipalities in the country administer a free educational system, which is used by the lowerincome sectors. Unfortunately, the quality of this service is very low and, instead of reducing social differences, it maintains and reinforces them.
Basic education is compulsory in Chile and parents have freedomwithin their economic possibilities -to choose where they want their children to study. There are three sub-systems in Chile, depending on who administrates the establishments: the municipal schools, the private subsidized (by the state) schools and the paying private schools. In 1997, basic educational coverage in the metropolitan region was 95.5 per cent of all school age children. But the level of service varies according to the income group served and the geographical area in which the schools are located. The service offered by municipal schools is not the same as the one offered by private subsidized schools. In the 1980s, due to a reduction in state contributions, financial resources decreased in municipal schools which were serving mainly children from low-income homes. This resulted in a major deterioration in infrastructure and equipment, along with a decrease in teachers' salaries which weakened their motivation and created obvious negative repercussions on the quality of education.
The peripheral areas of the city, which concentrate the lowest-income populations, are most affected by this situation. At the beginning of the 1990s, most municipal institutions showed significant levels of deterioration in their infrastructure and equipment. Their physical condition was very poor -and there was a great need for equipment and for maintenance and repair of the classrooms, dining rooms, bathrooms, patios and places for physical education.
The situation is better in private subsidized schools. Although many are administered along commercial lines, they try to maintain the image of offering better infrastructure and equipment than municipal schools in order to attract more enrollment. Nevertheless, these expenses imply less resources for services such as extra-curricular education, school psychologists and special education.
The quality of service varies according to the educational sub-system. This is confirmed by the findings of the SIMCE test (Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación/Quality of Education Measuring System), a test that has been applied since 1988 in all the country to the fourth and eighth grades of basic education. Table 4 shows the average outcomes of the 1997 SIMCE test (eighth grade) for the country as a whole and for the metropolitan region (including all three sub-systems).
The territorial expression of this inequity is obvious: the best averages are visibly concentrated in the richest comunas of Santiago, namely, Las Condes, Providencia and Vitacura, where the percentage of municipal schools is almost zero (see maps 1 and 2). The location of construction is another example of the inequity in Santiago's recent development. The city of Santiago currently covers 60,000 hectares, up from 45,000 ten years ago. However, this growth has not been homogeneous, as reflected in the distribution of approved building permits by comuna. In the last year, 39.5 million square metres were approved in the city of Santiago. This is not a small figure (8) when one compares it to the total constructed surface in Santiago of 110 million square metres in 1990. The figures do not show the spatial distribution of construction. Consider first the issue of approved construction area by comuna. Almost half of the approved area is located in four comunas, and 90 per cent in 15 of the 34 comunas. In other words, in more than half (19) of the Greater Santiago area comunas which, according to the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas/National Statistics Institute) hold more than 2.4 million people, there has been practically no construction (see Map 3).
The growth pattern of the city has been regulated by market tendencies, and has produced: a lack of growth and improvement in consolidated areas of the city; the construction of social housing on inexpensive land in peripheral zones; and a concentration of housing opportunities for higher-income sectors in the north-eastern peripheral area. These 8. Conversation with Pablo Trivelli.
Map 3: The comunas of Greater Santiago that concentrate more than 90 per cent of the Office Space Constructed between 1990 and 1998 (in square metres)
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The comunas of Greater Santiago that concentrate more than 90 per cent of the total square meters constructed between trends become clearer when one looks at the distribution of the average sizes of the approved houses, with an average of more than 200 square metres in the north-eastern part of the city compared to a 40-50 square metre average in the western and southern peripheral areas (see Map 4).
The low levels of construction in the comunas of the downtown area of the city -in some, construction has been almost nil -has resulted in a deterioration of urban infrastructure, an accelerated loss of urban heritage and an increase in the value of the land and buildings. There has been one exception, namely, the repopulating policy sponsored by Santiago municipality through the Santiago Development Corporation, which has reversed the trend towards a falling population. This has shown how a programmed and concerted action can positively modify the tendencies of the real estate market.
The new location trends for office buildings are perhaps the most significant example of segregation. Offices are no longer concentrated in the city centre. Ninety-six per cent of the total office space constructed between 1990 and 1998 is shared between five of the 34 comunas (see Map 5) This shows how the globalization process is restructuring cities, by creating new services zones with new location patterns, complemented by high quality urban infrastructure.
IV. THE FACE OF FEAR (9)
THE PERCEPTION OF insecurity affects social life, with a decrease in social contact, a tendency to self-confinement and a loss of public meeting spaces. In a city with such socio-economic segregation, the perception of insecurity in public space severely limits the possibilities of interaction between inhabitants of different social strata. This perception, however, is associated with a typically Chilean social bias that has influenced the way we design our cities, as expressed in the fact that 41 per cent of the city's neighbourhoods are socially homogeneous. The perception of insecurity and the abandonment of public space, both physical and social, functions as a circular and cumulative process. All this leads us to think that, if we lose the spaces for social interaction -ultimately, the place where the collective identity is built -the perception of insecurity increases.
a. Public Space and Insecurity due to Delinquent Violence
Violence in Chilean cities is a new theme in studies and in the political and social agenda, and one on which there is still little information. In general, comparative analysis of violence indices has shown Santiago to be a safe city in the Latin American context. One study (10) named Chile as 9. See Oviedo, Enrique and Alfredo Rodríguez (1998), "Santiago, una ciudad con temor. Inseguridad ciudadana y pérdida del espacio público", Boletín Temas Sociales 25, SUR, Programa de Pobreza y Políticas Sociales, Santiago. Cammant (1976) , Violence and Repression in Latin America, The Free Press, New York and London.
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Map 5: Location of 96 per cent of the Office Space in Greater Santiago
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The comunas of Greater Santiago which concentrate 96 per cent of the total office space built between 1990 and 1998 one of three countries with the lowest violence indices in Latin America. Rates of violence in Santiago, as in the country as a whole, have not increased in the last ten years. Nevertheless, the issue of citizen security is increasingly present in the media and in opinion surveys, particularly when considering delinquency. In the case of Santiago, inhabitants claim to feel more insecure in public spaces than in private ones, a situation that is contradictory to national statistics. According to this data, theft, forceful robbery and violent robbery affect residences more than they do persons, institutions or vehicles (see Table 5 ). (11) Throughout the 1990s, there has been an absence of autonomous organization and of participation among the poor communities of the city as well as a lack of long-range perspective. Social capital has been lost, following the loss of poor neighbourhood and community political movements (the so-called movimientos poblacionales) which were concerned not only with access to public programmes but also with political representation.
Political recognition and practical effective leadership in low-income neighbourhoods has deteriorated (the "crisis of organizations"). Simultaneously, many of the social leaders maintain a very strong critical perspective on politics as well as on politicians. On the other hand, life in poor neighbourhoods in Santiago has become more dangerous, making citizen security a central problem. Organizational mechanisms that acted as restraints on violence and crime have weakened. Thus, neighbourhoods have become disarticulated and more insecure, and people look for solutions in a strengthening of the police presence. V. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION THE SUB-NATIONAL Chilean political administrative structure is composed of 13 regions (each headed by an intendente), divided into 51 provinces (administrated by governors) and these further divided into 341 comunas (administrated by mayors). (12) This structure does not include a specific category for cities or urban zones such as metropolitan areas or urban networks or agglomerations. As noted earlier, Greater Santaigo includes 32 comunas in Santiago province and one comuna in each of the Cordillera and Maipo provinces. The central comuna is also called Santiago. There is no government body with responsibility for the entire city or, in this case, for the metropolitan area.
In Chile, there are no institutions with special jurisdiction over cities. This is particularly worrying for Santiago, given its complexity and administrative fragmentation. The lack of institutions with specific attributions or competencies over cities has given way to regional institutions -such as regional ministerial secretariats and regional directorships of national ministries (e.g. housing and urban development; public works; transportation) -or even decentralized institutions -such as the National Environmental Commission (CONAMA: Comisión Nacional del Ambiente) -that intervene in all the cities of the country. In fact, these three ministries and CONAMA are, perhaps, the institutions with the most power to structure urban development in Santiago. They design and build the highway network and the urban road system, decide on the location of social housing, regulate transportation and determine environmental conditions, among other things.
a. Financial Resources for comunas
There is very little possibility for a municipality to influence sectoral national policies that set public investment. The major decisions on infrastructure and social investments in Chile belong to the government (the Executive). In some cases, some influence can be exerted through Congress, at the time when the annual national budget is discussed for approval. The few municipalities that administer their own investment resources (no more than five in the country) can negotiate with the ministries and other government agencies with more chance of influence. This is important because neither regional nor local governments (municipalities) decide on the main investments in the urban areas.
Currently, there is a ten-fold difference in the per capita income of municipalities within Santiago as well as in per capita expenditure between the richest (Santiago) and poorest (La Pintana) comunas. At the beginning of the decade, this difference was seven-fold. Thus, per capita incomes and expenditures in richer municipalities have increased more than in poorer municipalities: 
12. The municipality's first and main authority is the mayor, who is its leader and in charge of administration. The mayor holds a four-year term of office and can be re-elected. The council candidate who obtains at least 35 per cent of all valid votes and who belongs to the list with most votes is proclaimed mayor. If these requisites are not complied with, the municipal government elects a mayor from among the elected council members.
VI. IS IT POSSIBLE TO GOVERN SANTIAGO?
WHAT CAN BE done with this segregated and fragmented Santiago? The city needs administrative and political organization, something which does not occur in Chile where cities, as such, do not have political or administrative statutes. This forms a substantial part of the democratic improvements that are still necessary in Chile's political institutions. The political and administrative management of the city requires a more advanced decentralization process. Indeed, the 34 municipalities might have a central role in urban management if they had the necessary competencies and resources. Otherwise, in the case of Santiago, the metropolitan body in charge of coordination -be it a city administration or a metropolitan government -will end up paying attention solely to the most needy municipalities and to urban crises (e.g. floods, environmental problems, etc.). This could mean the loss of an overall vision of the city and of the possibility of a political-strategic management of the metropolitan area. The implications of decentralization for the city means that, among other things, sooner or later all the city authorities should be elected directly by the citizens.
An urban policy on public space should have a high strategic priority in urban development for the next decade. In recent years, the only public space that has been omitted from rapid real estate development is that aimed at addressing the demands of motor vehicles. In fact, a large part of urban transportation policy favours privileged transportation systems (auctions of bus routes, plans for bus modernization, technological innovations for motor vehicle engines, urban road concessions) over the citizens who use the systems. The citizen, in its essentially pedestrian condition, finds less and less space, security and tranquility in the city.
It is essential that a recuperation of public space is undertaken with citizens and their organizations. Public space must draw together people's local preferences and interests. What is at stake is the return of basic certainties and trust in people, in their creative capacities and collective experiences as well as a feeling of belonging to a common space where a feeling of we, the citizens, is founded.
